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Abstract 
Fewer Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) beneficiaries have their earnings suspended or 
terminated because of work than those who are actually working, partly because beneficiaries 
“park” earnings at a level below substantial gainful activity (SGA) to retain benefits. We assess 
the extent of parking by examining how beneficiary earnings and months off the rolls for work 
responded to a 1999 change in the SGA level for non-blind beneficiaries from $500 to $700 per 
month. Specifically, our difference-in-difference analysis compares longitudinal data for two 
beneficiary cohorts with different incentives to park their earnings; one experienced the 
increased SGA level the first year after its Trial Work Period (TWP), when beneficiaries can 
earn any amount without losing benefits, while the two-year-earlier cohort did not. The impact of 
the increased SGA level is consistent with parking, but its magnitude small. The reduction in 
TWP completers with earnings less than $500 was 1.0 percentage points, the reduction in the 
percentage with earnings over $700 was 1.2 percentage points, and the increase for those with 
earnings between $500 and $700 was 2.2 percentage points. However, there was no change in 
mean earnings; small increases for those with relatively low earnings were offset by reductions 
for those with relatively high earnings. The SGA increase had a significant negative effect on the 
average number of months that beneficiaries were off the rolls for work; the effect was largest—
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The Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) program is designed to support qualified 
individuals who are unable to engage in ―substantial gainful activity‖ (SGA) due to a medically 
determinable physical or mental impairment that is expected to result in death or last for at least a 
year.1 Growth in the DI rolls in recent decades has been substantial; from 2000 to 2007 alone, the 
number of disabled worker beneficiaries increased by approximately two million, to more than seven 
million beneficiaries (SSA 2008). Autor and Duggan (2006) document some of the reasons for this 
rapid expansion: aging of the labor force, growth in the percentage of women that meet the 
program’s work history requirements, changes in eligibility criteria, rise in the value of the Medicare 
benefits for which DI beneficiaries attain eligibility after 24 months on the rolls, and a rise in the 
after-tax DI replacement rate for low-wage workers. 
In addition to the rising number of people who receive DI benefits, employment rates among 
beneficiaries have been declining over the years. Employment among working-age people with 
disabilities is significantly lower than for those without disabilities—in 2008, 39 percent of those 
with disabilities worked, compared with 77 percent of those without disabilities (United States 
Census Bureau 2009). This differential has not improved in recent decades, and in fact, seems to 
have worsened (Weathers and Wittenburg 2009).  
Once workers enter the DI program, a substantial minority returns to work, but a much smaller 
share leaves the rolls because of work. In each year, the number who leaves the rolls is minimal, but 
over time, more beneficiaries do ultimately have their benefits terminated because they are working. 
For instance, of those who received their DI awards in 1996, 28 percent had annual earnings of at 
                                                 
1 Individuals who qualify based on their own earnings record must have worked in a Social Security-covered 
position for 5 of the last 10 years.  
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least $1,000 in the next 10 years, but only 6.5 percent had their benefits suspended for at least a 
month because of work, and only 3.7 percent had their benefits terminated because of work 
(Stapleton et al. 2010a).   
One reason that the percentage of beneficiaries who have their earnings suspended or 
terminated because of work is far lower than the percentage that return to work is because of 
―parking‖—beneficiaries keeping their earnings below the level considered to be SGA in order to 
retain benefits. In 2010, this amount is $1,000 monthly for non-blind beneficiaries, and $1,640 for 
blind beneficiaries (SSA 2010). If beneficiaries engage in SGA for a sustained period of time, they 
risk losing their DI benefits (described in more detail below). The complete loss of benefits as 
earnings increase from just below SGA earnings to just above is often called the ―cash cliff.‖ Unless 
the earnings increase is large enough to more than make up for the benefit loss at that point, total 
income from earnings plus benefits actually declines. Hence, there is strong incentive to ―park‖—to 
keep earnings just below the SGA level. Anecdotes about this behavior are widespread, but no 
statistics on the extent of this phenomenon are available.  
If parking is widespread, then policy reforms designed to increase work incentives for SSDI 
beneficiaries capable of SGA could potentially increase beneficiary earnings and reduce reliance on 
benefits. A $1-for-$2 benefit offset for earnings above the SGA level, currently being tested by the 
Social Security Administration (SSA), is an important example of such a reform. Widespread parking 
might also explain why so few beneficiaries have exited the rolls under the Ticket to Work program 
(Stapleton et al. 2008). It would also suggest that increases in the SGA level might induce increases 
in SSDI entry by those able to engage in SGA. If, instead, parking is fairly rare, then efforts to 
address the work incentive issue only are not likely to have large impacts on earnings and benefits, 
parking is not an important reason for low exit rates under Ticket, and SSDI entry is likely not very 
sensitive to modest increases in the SGA level. 
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In this paper we investigate on how common parking is among DI beneficiaries by examining 
how a major change in the non-blind SGA level affected beneficiary earnings and months off the 
rolls for work. In July 1999, the SGA level for non-blind beneficiaries increased from $500 per 
month to $700 (SSA 2010). Prior to this time, the non-blind SGA level had been nominally set at 
$500 since 1990. After the 1999 increase, the non-blind SGA level was indexed to the average wage 
index (AWI), and, as a result, has increased nominally in every subsequent year except 2010. While 
the SGA level for non-blind beneficiaries increased substantially in 1999, the SGA level for 
statutorily blind individuals increased only because of the small AWI adjustment (Table I.1).  
Previous studies have not found a significant impact of the change in the SGA level on 
individual employment and earnings, but there are three reasons why they might not have detected 
such behavior, even if it were substantial. First, earlier studies have not distinguished between blind 
and non-blind beneficiaries. Second, and perhaps more importantly, they have not distinguished 
between those who have completed the Trial Work Period (TWP) and those who have not. The 
TWP consists of nine months (not necessarily consecutive) over a rolling 60-month period during 
which the beneficiary can earn any amount without loss of benefits. We address these two 
limitations by using longitudinal SSA administrative data on annual cohorts of non-blind TWP 
completers, focusing on the period just after they complete the TWP.  
The third limitation of previous studies is that they did not allow for the disparate effects of an 
increase in the SGA earnings level on those earning below the old SGA level and on those who 
earned so much under the old SGA that they had left the rolls for work. In theory, an increase in the 
SGA level could induce some in this high-earnings group to reduce their earnings, countering any 
positive impact of the SGA increase on the earnings of those with lower earnings. These offsetting 
effects might account for the absence of a substantial impact on the average earnings of beneficiaries 
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in earlier studies. We address this limitation by studying changes in earnings for individuals grouped 




We exploit the change in the non-blind SGA level in 1999 to assess the extent to which 
individuals engage in parking behavior. Our analysis compares the longitudinal earnings and time off 
the rolls for work of the 1998 TWP cohort to corresponding outcomes for the 1996 TWP cohort. 
These two cohorts faced the same nominal SGA level in the year they completed the TWP, but the 
nominal value for the 1998 cohort increased by $200 halfway through the first year after TWP 
completion, whereas it remained the same for the 1996 cohort until halfway through the third year 
after TWP completion. Our difference-in-difference (DD) methodology compares changes from the 
TWP completion year to two years after TWP completion for the 1998 cohort (spanning the 
increase in the SGA level) to corresponding changes for the 1996 cohort. The effects of the increase 
in the SGA level are clearly evident in the data, but their size is not very large.  
In the next section, we describe the ―work incentive‖ features of the DI program, which were 
designed to provide beneficiaries with an opportunity to test their ability to engage in SGA without 
immediate loss of benefits, and consider the theoretical impacts of an increase in the SGA level on 
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earnings and benefit receipt. In Section III, we review the earlier literature on the effect of changes 
in the SGA level on beneficiary earnings. Section IV describes our data and sample, and Section V 
describes the DD methodology we use to identify the impact of the increase in the SGA level. 
Section VI presents earnings distributions of successive TWP cohorts, Section VII presents the 
results of our DD estimates, and Section VIII summarizes findings from alternative specifications 
and robustness checks. Section IX concludes by providing estimates about the extent to which 
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The SGA earnings level is closely tied to the statutory definition of disability for adults, as 
described in the introduction. SSA considers a person to be engaged in SGA, and therefore not 
disabled by the statutory definition, if unsubsidized earnings, net of any impairment-related work 
expenses, exceed the SGA level. Hence, beneficiaries may work, as long as the work is not 
considered to be SGA. The TWP was designed to encourage beneficiaries to return to SGA, by 
giving them a chance to test their ability to do so without benefit loss. An individual’s TWP lasts for 
nine (not necessarily consecutive) months in a rolling 60-month period, meaning that over the 
course of any five-year period, a beneficiary can earn any amount for up to nine months and still 
remain on the SSDI rolls.  
Months with sufficiently low earnings do not count toward the nine-month TWP limit. The 
TWP earnings limit from 1990 to 2000 was $200 per month (or 40 hours of self-employment); it was 
increased to $530 monthly (or 80 hours of self-employment) in 2001 and has been indexed to the 
AWI in each year since. In 2009, the monthly TWP limit was $700. In other words, only months in 
which a beneficiary earned more than $700 in 2009 counted toward his or her TWP. The TWP limit 
is the same for both blind and non-blind SSDI beneficiaries. Because of the change in the TWP limit 
in 2001, we restrict our analysis to cohorts of TWP completers prior to that year, since the earnings 
distributions of cohorts that completed the TWP before and after that change could be substantially 
different.  
After exhausting the TWP, the beneficiary enters the Extended Period of Eligibility (EPE), and 
benefits continue indefinitely if the beneficiary does not engage in SGA. If he or she does have 
earnings above the SGA level, benefits are paid for three additional Grace Period (GP) months. 
After that point, benefits are suspended in full during each month that the beneficiary engages in 
SGA, but otherwise are paid in full until the 36th EPE month. If earnings are above SGA in the 36th 
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month, benefits are terminated; otherwise full benefits continue until the first month of SGA after 
GP completion, at which point they are terminated. This structure of benefits explains why at least 
some fraction of beneficiaries may engage in parking behavior. During the TWP and GP, 
beneficiaries have little incentive to restrain earnings, as benefits continue regardless of the amount 
of earnings in those months. After finishing the TWP and GP, however, there is strong incentive to 
restrain earnings below the SGA level.  
Among beneficiaries who have completed their TWP and are in their EPE, the expected effect 
of an SGA increase on earnings and months off the rolls depends on what their earnings would have 
been in the absence of the increase. First, those who would have had earnings below the initial SGA 
level might increase their earnings by up to $200, because they could do so without exceeding the 
new, higher SGA level. For example, someone who kept his or her monthly earnings at $475 to stay 
below an SGA level of $500 might now earn $675 if the SGA level were increased to $700. For these 
types of individuals, we would expect to see higher average annual earnings but no change in the 
number of months spent off the rolls for work, since these beneficiaries would continue to receive 
benefits in each month they worked.  
Second, those who would have earned above the new SGA and thus lost their benefits, might 
make an effort to earn less than the new SGA level so as to retain benefits. Consider, for example, 
someone with an SSDI benefit of $600 who has the potential to earn $1,200. With an SGA level of 
$500, the beneficiary could retain benefits by keeping earnings just below $500, for total income of 
just under $1,100, or could forego benefits and increase income to $1,200. Under an SGA level of 
$700, this same individual could retain benefits by keeping earnings just below $700, for total 
income of just under $1,300—more than the beneficiary would earn if he or she were to forego 
benefits. This individual has a stronger incentive to keep earnings below the new SGA level than 
below the initial SGA level, and is therefore more likely to reduce earnings and retain benefits under 
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the new SGA level. More generally, we would expect the earnings of those who would have earned 
above $700 under the old SGA level to decrease under the new SGA level, and for them to spend 
fewer months off the rolls for work. 
Third, those who would have earned an amount between the initial $500 SGA level and the 
new $700 level, and thus left the rolls, are not likely to change the amount they earn by much but 
will be able to retain their benefits. These individuals would have left the rolls under the initial SGA 
level despite the strong incentive to restrain their earnings and remain on the rolls.   
Given the relationship between earnings in the absence of the SGA increase and the effect of 
the SGA increase on earnings, we would expect to see a change in the cumulative distribution of 
earnings for TWP completers much like the stylized change displayed in Figure II.1, assuming that 
all else is held constant. The percentage of those with earnings below the initial SGA is expected to 
fall, the percentage with earnings above the new SGA is also expected to fall, and the old and new 
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To our knowledge, there have been no rigorous studies of parking behavior, and relatively few 
studies that assess the impact of SGA changes. Previous work that has studied the impact of 
increases in the SGA level has found little overall impact on employment and earnings. Franklin 
(1976) found that changes in the SGA level in 1966 and 1968 had little effect on increasing the labor 
force participation rate of beneficiaries. In follow-up work, Franklin and Hennessey (1979) found 
that increases in 1966, 1968, and 1974 were not followed by increases in earnings among 
beneficiaries. They posited that because median annual earnings were so far below annualized SGA, 
the changes affected work incentives for only a few beneficiaries.  
A more recent report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) also found that SGA 
level increases affect the earnings of only a small portion of beneficiaries (2002). Looking from 1985 
to 1997, the GAO report found that only 1 percent of all beneficiaries, and only 7.4 percent of 
beneficiaries who worked in a given year, had earnings greater than 75 percent of the (annualized) 
level of SGA. In other words, SGA mattered little for most beneficiaries. Following beneficiaries 
over time, the report found that of those who earned near the SGA level in a given year, most had 
substantial declines in earnings over time. However, about 13 percent who had earnings near the 
SGA level in 1985 had earnings close to the SGA level a decade later, providing some evidence that 
workers with higher earnings may respond to increases in the SGA and may engage in parking 
behavior. However, this evidence is not definitive—it is not known what share of those earning 
close to the SGA level would have had higher earnings if SGA had not been higher. Recognizing the 
limitations of the data in measuring the effect of the SGA level on earnings, the GAO report called 
for more research before drawing conclusive findings. 
One reason the existing literature has found little evidence of the impact of increases in the 
SGA level on earnings might be that earlier studies examined all DI beneficiaries, including blind 
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beneficiaries, whose earnings were not subject to the same SGA earnings limit, as well as those who 
had not completed their TWP. The incentive to restrain earnings really begins after individuals 
complete their TWP—but many beneficiaries who return to work never complete their TWP. Thus, 
increases in the SGA level matter very little for a large fraction of DI beneficiaries. Indeed, Franklin 
(1976) noted that the TWP had more impact on beneficiaries’ attempts to work than the SGA level 
did, though clearly the interaction of the two was also important.  
Previous studies also have not allowed for different effects of an increase in the level of SGA 
based on the earnings of beneficiaries prior to the change. In theory, not only might an increase in 
the SGA induce those with earnings below that level to increase their earnings, it could also induce 
some in the high-earnings group to reduce their earnings. These two changes can have opposing 
effects on the average level of earnings before and after the SGA increase, which might explain the 
absence of a substantial impact on the average earnings of beneficiaries in earlier studies 
  Mathematica Policy Research 
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Our analysis sample was drawn from the 2007 Ticket Research File (TRF07), which contains 
longitudinal SSA administrative data on all working-age beneficiaries who participated in the DI or 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs for at least one month between January 1996 and 
December 2007. The TRF contains demographic information about beneficiaries as well as a 
monthly history of their DI and SSI benefit receipt, any time spent off of the disability rolls, use of 
work incentives (including the month of TWP completion), and many other variables generated 
from SSA administrative records. Data from the TRF were merged with annual earnings records 
contained in SSA’s Master Earnings File (MEF) for several years before and after TWP completion.  
The key outcomes in our analysis are annual earnings and percent of months in a year spent off 
the DI rolls for work in a calendar year. Nominal annual earnings were converted to monthly 
amounts by dividing the annual amount by 12, for purposes of comparison with the monthly SGA 
amount. The percent of the months in a year off the rolls for work is based on a monthly variable 
contained in the TRF, known as the ―left due to work (LDW)‖ indicator. This variable identifies 
months in which benefits were suspended or terminated because of earnings above SGA.  
Using the TRF, we identified 373,679 DI beneficiaries who completed their TWP between 
January 1996 and December 2000. We excluded 50,003 whose birth date indicated they were under 
the age of 18 or over age 59 at the end of the calendar year during which they completed their TWP, 
who had died in the five calendar years following TWP completion, or who had inconsistent data 
related to their initial DI entitlement and TWP completion dates. This left a final sample of 323,676, 
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or 87 percent of all TWP completers during the period. Of this sample, 2.2 percent (6,612 
beneficiaries) were identified as being subject to the blind SGA.2  
The size of annual TWP completer cohorts increased steadily from 1996 through 2000, peaking 
at just over 75,000 in 2000 (Table IV.1).3 Understanding differences in the demographics of TWP 
completer cohorts is important in assessing the extent to which observed changes in outcomes 
might reflect compositional differences in the cohorts as opposed to impacts of the SGA increase. 
The demographic profile of TWP completer cohorts from 1996 to 2000 was relatively constant, 
suggesting that changes we observe are unlikely to solely reflect changing demographics of TWP 
completers. Later cohorts, however, were somewhat more likely to be over 40 years old, female, 
non-Caucasian, and have certain primary disabling conditions such as back problems and major 
affective disorders. This generally mirrors the changing demographic profile of all DI beneficiaries 
during this period (Appendix Table 1). 
 
                                                 
2 To identify blind individuals, we used a variable in the administrative records indicating the date a person was 
determined to be blind by SSA for purposes of determining SGA. It is possible that some of those classified as non-
blind for our analysis were blind but had not been determined to be blind for SGA purposes. SSA does not determine 
the blind status of a beneficiary unless there is an administrative reason to do so. Determination of the SGA amount 
provides a reason for those who work, so our expectation is that there are few blind beneficiaries among the non-blind 
TWP completers.   
3 In 2001, the number of TWP completers fell to just over 45,000. The reason for this precipitous decline is the 
change in the TWP earnings limit in that year from $200 to $500, as previously described. This is an important reason to 
exclude the 2001 and later TWP completer cohorts from the analysis; they are not comparable to the earlier cohorts 
because far fewer of them had average monthly earnings below $500 during the TWP year. The likely effects of the 2001 
recession on beneficiary earnings are a second reason to exclude later cohorts (see Stapleton, Liu, Phelps and Prenovitz, 
forthcoming).  
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We use a DD strategy to estimate the impact of the SGA increase on the earnings distribution 
and months off the rolls for work of non-blind TWP completers in their second year after TWP 
completion.4 We examine the impact of SGA on the entire distribution of earnings because, as 
described previously, we expect the increase in the SGA level to induce increases in earnings for 
some of those who would otherwise have monthly earnings below the old SGA level (nominally 
$500), and induce reductions for some of those who would otherwise have earnings above the new 
SGA level (nominally $700).  
We also estimate the impact on mean earnings and on the percentage of months off the rolls 
for work, both in total and conditional on the earnings category in the TWP year. The conditional 
estimates are produced to verify that the impacts differ for low and high earners. Our expectation is 
that those with earnings near the old SGA amount in the TWP year are the ones most likely to 
increase their earnings as a result of the SGA increase, and those with TWP-year earnings above that 
level are most likely to reduce their earnings and their months off the rolls for work because of the 
SGA increase.  
For each outcome, we calculated for each cohort the change from the year of TWP completion 
to two years later. We then compared this difference across cohorts, initially starting with all annual 
cohorts of non-blind TWP completers from 1996 to 2000. For the 1996 cohort, the SGA level is at 
the old $500 level in both years. For both the 1997 and 1998 cohorts, the two years straddle the 
change in level, but the change occurred halfway during the second of the two years for the 1997 
cohort. For about half of the 1999 cohort and the entire 2000 cohort, the SGA level was already at 
                                                 
4 As mentioned previously, our analysis to date has not controlled for demographic differences across TWP 
completer cohorts, but will do so in the future. 
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the higher level when they completed the TWP. Because the earnings data are annual and the SGA 
level increased in the middle of 1999, a comparison of changes in earnings from the TWP year to 
two years later for the 1998 and 1996 cohorts is the most direct way to estimate the effect of a large, 
full-year change in the SGA level on full-year earnings. 
We present estimates using the 1996 and 1998 cohorts of the following form:  
Yit =ai+bDt+cCi+gCiDt+mXi+eit 
Dt is an indicator variable for the second year after TWP completion and Ci is an indicator for the 
1998 cohort. The coefficient of interest in this model is g, the DD estimate of the change for the 
1998 cohort two years after TWP completion relative to the similar change for the 1998 cohort. X is 
a vector of individual characteristics in the year of TWP completion as shown in Table IV.1, plus a 
set of indicator variables for the calendar month of TWP completion.5 
Like other DD estimators, the validity of our analysis relies on the assumption that the cohorts 
subject to the change in the level of SGA would have behaved similarly to the cohorts not subject to 
the change, and that the trend in outcomes across these cohorts would have been the same if not for 
the change in SGA (Imbens and Wooldridge 2007). In the next section, we assess this assumption 
for the 1996 and 1998 non-blind cohorts. For this study we also considered using contemporaneous 
blind TWP completer cohorts as comparison groups for the TWP completer cohorts, but 
comparisons of earnings for the blind and non-blind cohorts prior to the increase in the non-blind 
SGA level demonstrated that blind cohorts were an inadequate comparison group.6  
                                                 
5 Table IV.1 contains an aggregated set of primary disabling impairments; we included indicator variables for a 
broader set of conditions in our models.  
6 We also found substantive differences in the demographic characteristics of the blind and non-blind cohorts. The 
most notable difference, in addition to the obvious difference in primary impairments, is that blind beneficiaries in each 
cohort tended to be younger than their non-blind counterparts; for instance, the percentage of the 2000 non-blind 
cohort age 30 to 39 was 8 percentage points higher than for the 2000 non-blind cohort. 
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This section examines the suitability of using cohorts from 1996 to 2000 in the application of 
the DD method. We first compare the distributions of average monthly earnings in the TWP year 
over the range around the old and new SGA, from $300 to $1,100. The purpose of this comparison 
is to determine whether TWP-year distributions for the years prior to the SGA increase (1996 to 
1998) are sufficiently comparable to serve as the base year for the DD analysis. We also use this 
comparison to assess whether there is any evidence of a change in the TWP year distribution after 
the mid-1999 increase in SGA that might make the 1999 and 2000 cohorts unsuitable for the DD 
analysis. We then extend the comparisons to the first and second year after TWP completion, where 
we expect to see evidence of the SGA increase for the 1998 through 2000 cohorts, but also 
eventually expect to see effects of the 2001 recession that might be confounded with the effects of 
the SGA level increase. We apply the DD estimator to changes in the average annual earnings 
distribution from the TWP year to the year after TWP for the 1996 and 1997 cohorts, neither of 
which experienced an increase in the SGA level from the TWP year to the next year, to test whether 
the DD estimator might produce spurious results because of wage inflation or other potentially 
confounding factors. We conclude the section by comparing TWP-year estimates of months off the 
rolls for work, by earnings range, for the 1996 and 1998 cohorts, the base for the estimates used in 
the DD estimator for months off the rolls. 
In the TWP completion year, the distributions for successive cohorts shift downward in a 
uniform manner over the relevant range, with the exception of that for the 2000 cohort (Figure 
VI.1). It seems likely that the shift in each year reflects our use of nominal earnings. This was a 
period of economic expansion, so presumably each successive cohort, as a group, had somewhat 
higher nominal wages. There is a downward shift for the 2000 cohort relative to the previous cohort, 
but it is distinctly different than between the early cohorts; it is much larger at earnings levels below 
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the old SGA and much smaller for earnings levels above the new SGA. This pattern seems likely to 
reflect the fact that beneficiaries who complete the TWP early in a calendar year face benefit 
suspension if they engage in SGA for more than three months (i.e., the grace period months) later in 
the year. Thus, for at least part of the TWP year they have an incentive to keep earnings below SGA. 
Hence, the higher SGA faced by the 2000 cohort throughout its TWP year might have reduced the 
percentage with earnings below the old SGA and increased the percentage with earnings above the 
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For the first year after TWP completion, the distributions for the 1997 and 1998 cohort shift 
downward in a uniform manner relative to the distribution for the 1996 cohort over the range of 
earnings around SGA, even though the higher SGA applies to the 1998 cohort for half of the year. 
For the 1999 and, especially the 2000 cohort, the downward shift is not uniform; in fact, relative to 
the 1999 cohort, the distribution for the 2000 cohort shifts upward for earnings above the old SGA 
value and is even higher than the distribution for the 1998 cohort for earnings above the new SGA. 
The 2000 cohort’s earnings are for calendar year 2001, so it might be that its shape relative to the 
earlier cohorts partly reflects the effect of the 2001 recession.  
For the second year after TWP completion, the downward shift for the 1997 cohort is uniform 
relative to that of the 1996 cohort, but the downward shift for the 1998 cohort is much smaller 
above the new SGA than it is below the old SGA, consistent with our expectations. The 1999 
cohort’s distribution is very similar to that for the 1998 cohort, but actually lies slightly above the 
latter for earnings above the new SGA. The distribution for the 2000 cohort is remarkable in that it 
shifts upward relative to that for the 1999 cohort over the entire range around SGA. The 
distributions for the 1999 and 2000 cohorts are for calendar years 2001 and 2002, respectively; it 
seems likely that any effect of the 1999 SGA increase on their distributions is confounded with the 
effects of the 2001 recession. This is the obvious explanation for the shift observed for the 2000 
cohort in the second year after TWP completion.7,8 For this reason, we exclude these later cohorts 
from the DD analysis. 
                                                 
7 Appendix Figure 3 contains the full distribution for the 1996 cohort in the TWP year and the two years after, for 
earnings up to $5,000 per month. Approximately eight percent of each cohort did not have earnings in the TWP 
completion year, likely a data anomaly or earnings reporting error. Approximately 15 percent did not have earnings in 
the year after TWP completion and 22 percent two years after. This pattern was nearly identical in the 1997 and 1998 
cohorts.  
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We conclude that the TWP-year distributions for the 1996 through 1998 cohorts are quite 
comparable, apart from the small, similar effects of wage growth. We further conclude that cross-
cohort differences in the two years after the TWP completion year for these cohorts also reflect the 
effects of wage growth, but that those for the 1997 and, especially, the 1998 cohorts start to reflect 
the effects of the 1999 SGA increase. Cross-cohort differences for the 1999 and, especially, the 2000 
cohorts presumably reflect the effects of the increase in the SGA level, but starting in calendar year 
2001 also appear to reflect the effects of the 2001 recession. 
The DD methodology potentially controls for wage growth for periods when wage growth is 
steady, because it compares two-year changes in wages for the successive cohorts. If the effect of 
wage growth on earnings from the TWP year to two years later is comparable across the entire 
earnings range, and especially the range around the old and new SGA levels, the DD estimator will 
successfully control for it.  
To test whether the DD estimator successfully controls for the potentially confounding effect 
of different wage growth or other factors that might affect the earnings distributions of successive 
cohorts differently, we applied the estimator to the 1996 and 1997 cohorts for changes in the 
earnings distributions from the TWP completion year to the year after TWP completion. Because 
neither cohort experienced a change in the SGA level between these two years, the DD estimates in 
every earnings range should be close to zero if the estimator successfully controls for wage growth 
and any other potentially confounding factors. We also applied the DD estimator to earnings 
adjusted by the AWI—the same wage-growth index applied to the SGA level after 1999—to see if 
that adjustment would reduce any effects of potentially confounding factors in this period.  
                                                 
(continued) 
8 Part of the difference could also reflect changing demographics across TWP completer cohorts, though we would 
expect that if that were the case, the distributions in the TWP completion year would not look so similar across the 
cohorts. Our future analysis to control for demographics will take this into account.  
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The results are summarized in Table VI.1. When we use nominal earnings, the point estimates 
for effect of confounding factors on the percentage with earnings in each earnings interval in the 
year after TWP completion are small and not related to the level of earnings. The point estimate for 
the interval from $200 to $500 is largest in magnitude, but is only -0.3 percentage points, less than 
one percent of the 1997 cohort percentage in that category. The point estimate in the critical range 
between the old and new SGA is 0.0. When we adjust earnings by the AWI, we find much more 
substantial estimates in all intervals except the interval from $0 to $199; the largest estimate is for the 
interval of $1,000 or more—0.5 percentage points. Further, there is a pattern in the AWI-adjusted 






We conclude that the DD estimator applied to nominal wages during this period adequately 
controls for the effect of wage growth and other potentially confounding factors but it does not do 
so when it is applied to AWI-adjusted earnings. The results for AWI-adjusted earnings might occur 
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because the AWI is a poor measure of wage growth in the types of jobs typically held by 
beneficiaries, as is suggested by previous evidence.9  
Turning to percent of months during the TWP completion year spent off the rolls for work, we 
see that in most ranges of earnings, the values for the 1996 and 1998 cohorts are similar (Figure 
VI.2). The pattern in both years behaves according to expectations; as average monthly earnings 
during a year increase, the likelihood of spending more of the year off the rolls increases, reflecting 
more months with earnings above SGA. There are small differences within TWP-year earnings 
categories, which might reflect wage growth or other factors. The largest difference, for those with 
average monthly earnings in excess of $1,000, is only 0.2 months. Hence, we conclude that months 
off the rolls during the TWP year are a strong base for the DD estimator for this variable. 
                                                 
9 Autor and Duggan (2006) have previously shown that the growth rate of wages for jobs held by workers before 
they applied for benefits during this period was lower than the AWI.   
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Using the 1996 and 1998 cohorts of non-blind TWP completers, we calculate DD estimates for 
impacts in the second year after TWP completion. That is, we compare changes in outcome 
variables from the TWP year to two years after the TWP year for these two cohorts. For the 1996 
cohort, both years were prior to the July 1999 change in the non-blind SGA limit; hence, the change 
for this group represents what happens when there is no change in the nominal value of SGA. For 
the 1998 cohort, nominal non-blind SGA in the second year after the TWP completion is $200 
higher than in the TWP year. 
We first present DD estimates of the impact of the increase in the SGA level on the percentage 
of the 1998 TWP cohort with average monthly earnings within specified intervals (Figure VII.1 and 
Table VII.1), before turning to estimates for the impacts on mean earnings (Table VII.2) and the 
percentage of months off the rolls for work (Table VII.3). All of the estimates are for impacts in the 
second year after TWP completion. In each case, we present unadjusted group means, but the DD 
estimates are regression-adjusted, controlling for the variables described previously. The regression-
adjusted values tended to be the same as the unadjusted estimates to the third decimal place or 
more, suggesting that difference in characteristics between the 1996 and 1998 cohorts did not 
significantly affect their outcomes. 
DD estimates for the percentage with monthly earnings within intervals indicate that the $200 
increase in SGA resulted in a reduction in the percentage with earnings below $500, although not in 
every $100 interval; an increase in the percentage with earnings between $500 and $700; and a 
decline in the percentage with earnings above $700 (Figure VI.1, Table VII.1). The total reduction in 
the range below $500 is 1.0 percentage points, the total decline for the range above $700 is 1.2 
percentage points, and, tautologically, the total increase for the percentage between $500 and $700 is 
the sum of these two: 2.2 percentage points.  
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These estimates imply that, were it not for the increase in the SGA level, 1.0 percent of the 
1998 cohort would have kept their average monthly earnings in this year below $500 and that 1.2 
percent of the cohort would have had earnings above $700. Both are evidence of parking. They also 
suggest that between 1.2 and 2.2 percent of beneficiaries in the cohort—774 to 1,418 beneficiaries—
parked their earnings in this interval during the second year after TWP completion. Both bounds 
assume that the 1.2 percent of beneficiaries induced to reduce their earnings to less than $700 would 
have reduced them less if the SGA level had been increased more. The lower bound assumes that 
those induced to increase their earnings above $500 because of the SGA increase would not have 
increased them further even if the SGA level were increased further, while the upper bound assumes 
that they all would have increased their earnings more.  
 
 













We find a small and statistically insignificant positive effect of less than $4 per month on the 
mean earnings of all beneficiaries in the second year after TWP completion (Table VII.2). This 
unweighted total estimate reflects the effects of any changes in the distribution of TWP-year 
earnings from 1996 to 1998, which presumably are not caused by the SGA increase. We also show a 
weighted total estimate, based on DD estimates for the four TWP-year earnings intervals weighted 
by the percent of the 1998 cohort in that interval. The weighted total estimate is somewhat larger, 
but still small—$10 per month—and still not statistically significant. The total impact estimate 
disguises statistically significant, although small, positive impacts for the 50 percent of beneficiaries 
with TWP-year earnings below $500. The effect in this range was on the order of $16 per month, or 
6.3 percent of average monthly earnings in this range. We found insignificant effects of a similar 
magnitude for those earning between $500 and $1,000 in the TWP year. Even smaller and 
insignificant effects were found for the one-quarter with TWP-year earnings of $1,000 or more.  
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Consistent with expectations, the results show a significant negative effect of the SGA increase 
on the months during the second year after TWP completion that beneficiaries were off the rolls for 
work (Table VII.3). The weighted total DD estimate shows a statistically significant but small mean 
negative impact of 0.24 months, or 6.4 percent of the average number of months spent off the rolls 
for work by the 1998 cohort in the second year after TWP completion. The weighted total estimate 
was more than twice as large as the unweighted, reflecting variation in the magnitude of the effect 
with TWP-year earnings interval and differences between the TWP-year earnings distributions for 
the 1996 and 1998 cohorts. As expected, the effect was largest for those with TWP-year earnings in 
the range between the old and new SGA: -0.6 months, or 17.1 percent of the months that their 
counterparts in the 1998 TWP cohort were off the rolls in the second year after TWP completion. 
The negative effect for those with earnings under $500 in the TWP year was half as large, but almost 
as large in percentage terms (16.2 percent). The estimates also show small but statistically significant 
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All of the results we have presented thus far for the 1998 and 1996 cohorts are based on 
nominal earnings, without adjustment for changes in wage growth across the cohorts. The decision 
to use nominal earnings rather than AWI-adjusted earnings was based on the comparison of the two 
versions of the estimates applied to changes in the earnings distributions for the 1997 and 1996 
cohorts from the TWP year to the following year. That comparison suggested that estimates based 
on AWI-adjusted earnings would show systematic spurious impacts of the later increase in the SGA 
level, whereas the nominal version appeared to control for wage growth and any other factors that 
might have affected the two cohorts differently. Of course, we cannot determine that the findings 
from the comparison of the 1997 and 1996 cohorts for the first year after TWP completion would 
have been replicated for the comparison of the 1998 and 1996 cohorts for the second year after 
TWP completion if there had been no SGA increase. Hence, we replicated the nominal DD 
estimates for this period using the AWI-adjusted earnings. If there was a cohort difference in two-
year wage growth rates in the types of jobs obtained by TWP completers, and the difference in the 
AWI growth rates captured that difference well, the AWI-adjusted DD estimates would be preferred 
to the nominal estimates.  
Before proceeding, it is important to consider the implications of the AWI adjustment applied 
to earnings on their interpretation. Because we have used the AWI to adjust earnings for wage 
growth, the AWI-adjusted value of SGA changes for both cohorts.10 Further, the difference between 
the AWI-adjusted SGA changes for the two cohorts is not quite as large as the difference between 
the nominal SGA changes. For the 1996 cohort, the AWI-adjusted SGA value declines by $60 from 
                                                 
10 The AWI-adjusted SGA value is the nominal value divided by the AWI value for the same year and multiplied by 
the value for the base year. We used 2000 for the base year. Note that SSA now adjusts the SGA level by the AWI from 
two years prior to the current year, reflecting the lag in data availability.  
Effect of AWI Adjustment  Mathematica Policy Research 
34 
1996 to 1998; for the 1998 cohort, the AWI-adjusted SGA value increases by $135. Hence, when 
earnings are adjusted by AWI, we are in effect comparing outcome changes when SGA increases by 
$135 to outcomes changes when SGA decreases by $60, so the difference in the AWI-adjusted SGA 
change for the two cohorts is $195—just slightly smaller than the $200 difference in the nominal 
change. Thus, the results presented in this section should be interpreted as impacts of a $195 
increase in AWI-adjusted SGA.  
DD estimates for the percentage with monthly earnings within intervals indicate that the $195 
increase in AWI-adjusted SGA shows a positive impact in the range between $500 and $700 of 2.0 
percentage points, quite comparable to the 2.2 percentage point impact found for this interval using 
nominal earnings data. The results differ markedly, however, for lower and higher earnings levels. 
The AWI-adjusted results show a much larger decline for the percentage with earnings below $500 
(2.4 versus 1.0 percentage points) and an increase in the percentage with earnings above $700 of 0.4 
percentage points, instead of a decline of 1.2 percentage points. The latter is contrary to 
expectations; it is difficult to explain why the SGA increase would increase the percentage with 
earnings above the new SGA. 
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We find no significant effect of the SGA increase on the mean earnings of all beneficiaries; the 
weighted total estimate is nearly identical to the unweighted total (Table VIII.2). Differences do 
emerge over some TWP-year earnings intervals, however. Whereas we found significant positive 
impacts on earnings for those with TWP-year earnings below $500 using nominal earnings, with 








Finally, the results using AWI-adjusted earnings show a similar significant negative effect of the 
SGA increase on the percent of the year that beneficiaries were off the rolls for work as the nominal 
results (Table VIII.3). The AWI-adjusted DD estimate for the total effect is the same as for the 
estimate using nominal earnings because earnings play no role in the estimate. There are slight 
differences within earnings intervals, however. For both sets of estimates, we find significant and 
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substantial reductions for the earnings intervals below $1,000, but they are smaller when AWI-





Based on the findings of the earlier comparisons for the 1997 and 1996 cohorts, we believe that 
the results obtained using nominal earnings more accurately capture the impacts of the SGA 
increase than the AWI-adjusted estimates presented here. The AWI-adjusted estimates produce 
some findings that are counter to theoretical predictions such as an increase in the percent with 
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For a number of reasons described earlier, we limited our analysis to an examination of the 
impact of the increase in the SGA level on the earnings and months off the rolls for work of the 
1998 TWP completer cohort in the second year after TWP completion. Using our preferred 
estimates (based on nominal earnings), we found statistically significant impacts showing a decrease 
in the percentage with earnings below the old SGA, a decrease in the percentage with earnings 
above the new SGA, and an increase in the percentage with earnings between the old and new 
SGA—all consistent with theoretical predictions.  
We did not find statistically significant positive effects on mean beneficiary earnings, but the 
estimate for all beneficiaries disguises small statistically significant positive effects for those with 
relatively low earnings in their TWP year, because of opposing effects for those who would have 
earned more than the new SGA level in the absence of the increase. The largest impacts were for 
those with TWP-year earnings between $500 and $1,000 per month, but even in this range the 
average impact is only about $18 per month—less than three percent of the comparison group 
mean. We found statistically significant negative effects on months off the rolls for work; our 
preferred estimate is an average reduction of one-quarter of a month, or 6.4 percent of our estimate 
of the number of months off the rolls for work in the absence of the SGA increase (i.e., the 
estimated counterfactual). Effects are especially large for those with earnings between $500 and $699 
in the TWP completion year: six-tenths of a month, or over 17 percent of the estimated 
counterfactual. 
Although the impacts of the 1999 SGA increase clearly emerge from the data, and are stronger 
than those found in earlier studies, they do not appear to be large. Our preferred estimates suggest 
that between 1.2 and 2.2 percent of beneficiaries in the 1998 TWP completer cohort—773 to 1,418 
beneficiaries—parked their earnings in this interval during the second year after TWP completion 
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(that is, in 2000). The total number of beneficiaries who parked below the SGA level in 2000 was 
almost certainly much larger, however, because presumably many beneficiaries from other TWP 
completer cohorts were also parked.  
The impact estimates can be used to make back-of-the envelope inferences about the number 
of parkers in the average month of any year after 1999, provided that (1) an estimate of the number 
of beneficiaries who were off the rolls for work in the average month of that year is available, (2) the 
impact of the 1999 SGA level had the same percentage impact on months off the rolls for work for 
all beneficiaries in the later years, and (3) the ratio of the upper bound number of parkers to the 
lower bound for the later year is the same as the ratio among the 1998 TWP cohort in 2000. 
Stapleton et al. (2010b) find that approximately 200,000 DI beneficiaries were off the rolls because 
of work in the average month for each year from 2002 through 2006. Based on their estimates and 
the estimated impacts of the 1999 SGA increase on months off the rolls for work, we arrive at a 
range of 14,000 to 25,000 parkers in the typical month over this four-year period.11 This range is 
equivalent to 0.2 to 0.3 percent of the average number of beneficiaries on the rolls in December of 
these years. While this number is small relative to the total number of beneficiaries, it is large relative 
to the percentage whose benefits are suspended because of work in a typical month (about 0.5 
percent) or who are terminated in a typical year (also about 0.5 percent).12  
Presumably, the number of parkers during the early part of this period was reduced by the weak 
economy. Hence, in a stronger economy, the number of parkers might be larger than these estimates 
                                                 
11 The lower bound is obtained by assuming that beneficiaries were parked only in the months represented by this 
impact, and that the same percentage reduction applied to all beneficiaries off the rolls for work after TWP completion 
in the later year. If N is the number of beneficiaries off the rolls in the typical month of year t, then we estimate the 
lower bound for the number of parkers is PL = 0.064N/(1.0-0.064) = 0.068N and the upper bound is PU = 2.2PL/1.2 =  
1.83PL = 0.125N.  
12 In December 2006, the benefits of 33,613 DI worker beneficiaries were suspended because of work, 
representing 0.49 percent of all beneficiaries on the rolls in that month. In all of 2006 (SSA 2007), 36,242 beneficiaries 
had their benefits terminated because of work, or 0.53 percent of the number of beneficiaries in December. 
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suggest. Another reason the number might be larger in later years is that the 1998 cohort might not 
have had sufficient time to fully adjust to the higher SGA level by 2000. SSA’s use of AWI to adjust 
the SGA level since 2000 might have increased or reduced the number of parkers. 
The SGA level has increased with the AWI since 2000. If AWI growth has been more rapid 
than wage growth in the jobs that beneficiaries typically obtain, it seems likely to have further reduce 
the number of beneficiaries who have their benefits suspended, and eventually terminated, for work. 
That does not imply that percentage of beneficiaries who are parked is increasing, however, because 
some who might have restricted their earnings had the SGA level grown more slowly since 2000 
might not do so under the current SGA level.   
The findings imply that policy reforms designed to increase work incentives for SSDI 
beneficiaries capable of SGA could potentially increase the earnings of the small share of 
beneficiaries who are parked, but might also reduce the earnings of the even smaller share who leave 
the rolls because of work under current law. SSA’s test of the $1-for-$2 benefit offset for earnings 
above the SGA level might show increases in earnings for those who are parked under current law, 
but declines for those who would have left the rolls for work. 
We do not know if the SGA increase induced entry into DI. Given the length and uncertain 
outcome of the DI application process, we would not expect workers to be induced to leave their 
jobs and apply for benefits because of the increase in the SGA level. Workers who have lost their 
jobs for other reasons (e.g., during the recession) might, however, find application for DI a more 
attractive alternative because of the SGA increase, and some might successfully apply. Perhaps more 
importantly, workers who have lost their jobs for other reasons and would have entered DI even in 
the absence of the SGA increase are now less likely to leave the rolls for work than they were before 
the increase. That is, the ―reduced exit‖ of such workers might be a more important phenomenon 
than their induced entry.  
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